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The statistical number of the Railway Age (January 4, 1918, page
49) gives an account of the abandonment of 13oo miles of railroad in
1917. The miles abandoned exceeded the miles of new construction
that year. After referring to the new mileage for previous years the
article states:
"In 1917, however, there was 451 miles of railroad actually taken up
or in the process of being taken up and sold for junk. In addition there
was 491 miles of road on which operation was abandoned, and 396 miles
of road which the owners had asked permission from State commis-
sions or legislatures to abandon; and, as a matter of fact, this latter
figure does not represent all of the road, which would be taken up and
sold as junk if the owners could get permission so to do."
Since 1917, 4,262.26 miles of railroad have been abandoned, with or
without permission from state or federal authorities and petitions by
several companies for leave to abandon the whole or parts of their
respective lines are now pending before state and federal commissions
involving several hundred miles of railroad. There is also under dis-
cussion, by parties in interest, the proposed abandonment of other lines
where the operating expenses greatly exceed the gross revenues of the
roads. Considering the public and private interests involved, the
subject is of vital interest *and calls for thoughtful legislative
consideration by the states and the federal government.
Two questions are presented: (i) Has' a railroad company the
right to take up and remove its permanent tracks, bridges, turnouts,
switches, and fixtures attached to the right of way, and discontinue all
operation as a common carrier on such line, without the consent of
(a) the state in which it operates and the federal government in cases
where the line is used in interstate commerce, and (b) the adjacent land
owners who are directly and financially affected by the abandonment of
the line? (2) Upon what terms and conditions should such consent
be given?
Before discussing these questions it is well to have a clear concep-
tion of the legal character and status of a common carrier railroad as
determined by judicial authority in this country.
I
A public railroad is a "highway" differing only from the ordinary
highway in the ownership and the manner or mode of its use. Mr.




Justice Strong, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States,
said :'
"That railroads, though constructed by private corporations and
owned by them, are public highways, has been the doctrine of nearly all
the courts ever since such conveniences for passage and transportation
have had any existence..... .. It has never been considered a matter
of any importance that the road was built by the agency of a private
corporation. No matter who is the agent the function performed is
that of the state. Though the ownership is private, the use is public.
. . . . That all persons may not put their own cars upon the road, and
use their own motive power, has no bearing upon the question whether
the road is a public highway. It bears only upon the mode of use, of
which the legislature is the exclusive judge."
The construction of railroads, like the opening of ordinary streets and
highways, requires the exercise of sovereign powers and legislative
discretion. It is to meet and supply a public need. It is necessary to
the enlargement and efficiency of government. Population, wealth.
public revenues, are all dependent upon the extension of highways. The
ificrease of population in sparsely settled or unoccupied territory, the
growth of private and national wealth by the development of natural
resources, and the fabrication of manufactured products all depend
upon transportation. People will go just as far into the wilderness and
settle as they can go and produce something which they can market at
a little more than the cost of'production. The marketing depends upon
transportation. The ordinary highway will carry a people back into the
interior a short distance; turnpikes will induce them to go further;
canals will connect waterways and extend a population over a very large
territory; and a highway with rails, operated by steam or electricity,
will cover a continent with a population and thriving industries, A state
can no more do without these public facilities, of high efficiency, than
it can do without court houses, custom houses, jails, and public build-
ings. They are an essential and integral part of every civilized govern-
ment; and, as we know today, better than ever before, that nation is
strongest and most efficient ii peace and in war that has the best and
most improved system of transportation. To build public highways
of every kind is a "function of the State."2
The state may furnish highway facilities of any type in either of two
ways: It may build them or it may permit persons or corporations to
build them. In either case they are public highways, an inducement to
people to go out along them, settle, build homes and industrial plants, and
the use and continuance of such highways are subject to governmental
regulation and control.
IOlcott v. Supervisors (1872, U. S.) 16 Wall. 678, 694 et seq.
'Lake Shore and Mich. So. Ry. v. Ohio (1899) 173 U. S. 285, 302, 19 Sup. Ct.
465, 472; United States v. Joint Traffic Assn. (1898) 17, U. S. 505, 569 et seq.,
I9 Sup. Ct. 25, 32.
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II
Early in our history it became the public policy of our government, as
in England and some other countries, to construct and operate highways
requiring large expenditures of capital, such as toll roads, canals, and
railroads, through the agency of corporations with private capital,
organized under legislative acts. This policy resulted in creating three
distinct interests in the highways so constructed: (a) the private capi-
tal interest, represented in the rights of the companies, (b) the public
interest, the general welfare of the state, and (c) the material interests
of local people who, accepting this governmental provision, have gone
out along the railroad into new territory and invested their money in
homes and business enterprises depending upon the highway thus
established, and its maintenance, for access to market cities. The first
property interest is specially protected by the Constitution of the United
States, hereinafter commented upon, and the public interest is para-
mount in all matters of constitutional regulation. There is a contract
obligation on the part of each company to operate its highway to and
for the convenience of the public so long as it retains its charter or
charter rights. A few cases may be here noted in support of the
propositions stated.
Mr. Justice Bradley (dissenting on other points, Justices Gray and
Lamar concurring) said :3
"When a railroad company is chartered it is for the purpose of per-
forming a duty which belongs to the State itself. It is chartered as an
agent of the State for furnishing public accommodations. The State
might build its railroads if it saw fit." 4
Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking upon this subject for the court, said :5
"When the matter of the building of railroads as highways arose, a
question was presented whether the State should itself build them or
permit others to do it. The State did not.build them, and as their build-
ing required, among other things, the appropriation of land, private
individuals could not enforce such appropriation without a grant from
the State."
Mr. justice Peckham, again speaking for the court, said :6
"A State may furnish such facilities or direct them to be furnished
by persons or corporations within its limits without violating the Fed-
eral Constitution..... .. Railroads have from the very outset been
regarded as public highways and the right and the duty of the govern-
ment to regulate in a reasonable and proper manner the conduct and
business of railroad corporations have been founded upon that fact.
' Chicago, etc., Ry. v. Mintesota (189o) 134 U. S. 418, 461, 1o Sup. Ct 702, at
p. 703.
'Minnesota Rate Cases (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 416, 33 Sup. Ct. 731, 747.
'United States v. Joint Traffic Assn. (1898) 171 U. S. 505, 569, ig Sup. Ct.
25, 32.
* Wisconsin, etc., Ry. v. racobson (igoo) 179 U. S. 287, 295 et seq., 21 Sup. Ct.
115, 118 et seq.
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Constituting public highways of a most important character, the func-
tion of proper regulation by the government springs from the fact that
in relation to all highways the duty of regulation is governmental in its
nature. At the present day there is no denial of these propositions.
. . . . It is because they are such highways that the land upon -which
the rails are laid, and also that which may be necessary for the other
purposes of the corporation, is said to be used for a public purpose, and
on that ground the power of eminent domain which is given them is
held to be a consti4utional exercise of legislative authority.....
They are organized for the public interests and to subserve primarily
the public good and convenience."
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the court, said :7
"The question is, no longer an open one, as to whether a. railroad is a
public highway, established primarily for the convenience of the people.
and to subserve public ends, and subject to governmental control and
regulation. It is because it is a public highway ..... that the corpora-
tion by which it is constructed, and . . .. maintained may be
permitted under legislative sanction, to appropriate private property.
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, said :8
"The general principles to be applied are not open to controversy.
The railroad property is private propei-ty devoted to a public use. As
a corporation, the owner is subject to the obligations of its charter."
On the private side the capital and property of the quasi-public cor-
poration are protected by the provisions of the federal constitution.0
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, said :10
"A carrier cannot be compelled to carry on even a branch of business
at a loss, much less the whole business of carriage..... .. It is true
that if a railroad continues to exercise the powers conferred upon it by
a charter from a State, the State may require it to fulfil an obligation
imposed by the charter even though fulfilment in that particular may
cause a loss."
And in another case the same Justice, speaking for the court, said:"'
"If the burdens imposed are so great that the road cannot be run at
a profit, it can stop, whatever the misfortunes the stopping may
produce."'12
Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Ry. (189o) 135 U. S. 641, 657, IO Sup. Ct 965, 971.
'Northern Pacific Ry. v. North Dakota (1915) 236 U. S. 585, 595, 35 Sup. Ct.
429, 432 et seq.
' United States Const. (1789) Amendments 5 and 14.
"Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Ry. Comm. (1919) 251 U. S. 396, 399, 40 Sup. Ct. 183,
184.
.Erie Ry. v. Public Utilities Comm. (1921) 254 U. S. 394, 411, 41 Sup. Ct.
169, 171.
"See also statement by Mr. Justice Hughes, speaking for the court, in Northern
Pacific Ry. v. North Dakota (9,5) 236 U. S. at p. 595, 35 Sup. Ct. at p. 433; and
Norfolk and Western Ry. v. West Virginia (1915) 236 U. S. 6o5, 608 et seq., 35
Sup. Ct. 437 et seq.
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That a railroad company may be compelled, so long as it retains its
charter rights, to operate its line and extend its facilities for serving the
public, even at a loss, is clearly established. 13
Thus has the character and the status of a common carrier railroad
been clearly stated by the highest judicial authority of the land. Aside
from the protection given to the private capital invested in these high-
ways the reasons for continuing the maintenance and operation of a
railroad are the same that 'exist in reference to the continuance of any
highway.
'II
Coming now to our first question: Has a railroad company the right
to take up and remove its tracks, etc., and discontinue operation without
the consent (A) of the state in which it operates and of the federal gov-
ernment in cases where the line is used in interstate commerce; and
(B) the consent of adjacent land owners financially affected by such
abandonment?
The word "state" will be used in this paper in its generic sense and
not with reference to states in the federal union, unless otherwise
indicated.
Investing private capital in a public service corporation is voluntary
on the part of the investor. He invests for the purpose and with the
expectation of gain, but, like an investor in a purely private enterprise,
he assumes the risk of its being unprofitable. While it is a government
function to build rail highways and the government by its public policy
invites private capifal to perform this function, there is no guarantee by
the government that there will be no loss of the capital so invested.14
If the venture proves profitable, the profits go to the investor; if it
proves unprofitable and a loss occurs, the loss must be borne by the
private capital so invested. If serious loss has been sustained in an
endeavor to build a railroad and it appears that further losses will be
incurred by continuing the operation, the private investor has the right
to abandon the operation and withdraw that part of his capital which
remains, subject, however, to such regulations by the state as will secure
justice to all financially affected by such withdrawal. The right of a
carrier to abandon a highway that can be operated only at a loss, steadily
diminishing the capital invested, is acknowledged, but only with the
Northern Pacific Ry. v. Dustin (1892) 142 U. S. 492, 12 Sup. Ct. 283; Mis-
souri Pacific Ry. v. Kansas (iio) 216 U. S. 262, 270, 278 et seq., 3o Sup Ct. 330,
332, 336; Detroit, etc., Ry. v. Michigan Ry. Comn. (1916) 240 U. S. 564, 571
et seq., 36 Sup. Ct. 424, 427; Darnell v. Edwards (1917) 244 U. S. 564, 569 et seq.,
37 Sup. Ct. 701, 703; Mississippi Ry. Comm. v. Mobile and Ohio Ry. (1917) 244
U. S. 388, 390, 391, 396, 37 Sup. Ct. 6o2, 6o3, 605; People v. St. Louis, etc., Ry.
(1898) 176 Ill. 512, 519 et seq., 529 et seq., 52 N. E. .292, 294, 297 et seq.
1 4Smyth v. Ames (18!8) 169 U. S. 466, 526, I Sup, Ct. 418, 426; Missouri
Pacific Ry. v. Kansas, supra note 13, at the pages cited.
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consent of the state.1 5 Mr. Justice Campbell, speaking for the Supreme
Court of the United States, said :1'
"Important franchises were conferred upon the corporation to enable
it to provide the facilities to communication and intercourse, required
for the public convenience. Corporate management and control over
these were prescribed, and corporate responsibility for their insuf-
ficiency provided,. as .a remuneration to the community for their grant.
The corporation cannot absolve itself from the performance of its
obligations, without the consent of the legislature."
The relation of a private corporation to the tate in such cases is so
close and subordinate that a railroad company "cannot lease or alienate
any franchise, or any property necessary to perform its obligations and
duties to the state, without legislative authority."'17 Allen, J., speaking
for the Supreme Court of Kansas, said :18 "While the title to a com-
pleted railroad is'vested in the corporation, it is only private property
in a qualified sense. Railroads, like all other public thoroughfares,
are public instrumentalities."
Railroad companies, unlike strictly private corporations, owe a duty
to the public under their charters and cannot therefore voluntarily cease
to do business and dissolve without the consent of the state. In this,
quasi-public corporations differ from strictly private corporations.19
The franchises of a railroad company and the corporate powers essential
to the enjoyment of the franchises, are not subject to sale on execution
unless the legislature authorizes or assents to the transfer.20  As the
authority of the state is essential to the creation of a railroad corpora-
tion and the charter is a contract between the corporation and the state
that the company will perform its functions, it cannot abandon its
operations until released from performance, in some form, by the
state.
While, as already observed, the state cannot compel a railroad cor-
poration to continue operations that are unprofitable, if it surrenders its
charter or its charter rights as to the line it proposes to abandon, the
state may determine the conditions upon which such abandonment may
take place. This discussion has reference only to the highway; it does
not include equipment or movable property used in the operation of the
railroad.
(A) THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE
The state has a direct interest in the maintenance of every highway.
It is opened by the state, directly or through the agency of a corpora-
'"Brooks-Scaulon Co. v. Ry. Comm., supra note io; Erie Ry. v. Public Utilities
Comm., supra note ii.
" The York and Maryland Line Ry. v. Winans (1854, U. S.) 17 How. 30, 39,
quoted approvingly in Thomas v. Ry. (1879) 101 U. S. 71, 83.
' Thomas v. Ry., supra note 16.
'State v. Dodge City, etc., Ry. (1894) 53 Kan. 377, 378, 36 Pac. 747, 748.
1I Elliott, Railroads (3d ed. 1921) sec. 700, and cases cited.
"Ibid. sec. 5g6.
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tion, for public purposes, to serve the needs of the state. The great
highways for the movement of military forces, built by the Romans,
exist to-day and the exercise of such power is common to every nation.
The defense of a nation, in case of invasion, depends very largely upon
the character of its highways upon which it may move its military
forces, munitions and subsistence. Equally important to the state is
the development of national wealth, the increase and maintenance of
the values of taxable property. The increase in value of lands from a
nominal acreage value to hundreds of dollars per acre, common all over
this country, suggests the importance to the state of maintaining these
values for taxation, and sources of revenue. Whatever depreciates the
value of land and other property subject to taxation affects directly the
revenues of the state. In a recent case where the abandonment" of a
railroad was under consideration, evidence was submitted tending to
show that such abandonment would result in depreciating the value of
lands, in a large part of the county, fifty per cent., or "a million dollars
loss" in the value of farm lands. Other estinlates placed the loss upon
the farm lands in that portion of the county at from "IO per cent. to 4o
per cent. of the present value," according to the distance to other rail-
roads. The loss to the state in such a case is not and canhot be ques-
tioned. The more extensive the railroad which is to be abandoned, the
greater the territory dependent upon it for a rail highway, the larger the
loss of revenues to the state.
(B) THE PRIVATE INTERESTS
The loss in property values by the people who will be deprived of a
railroad facility is too apparent for discussion. The state is morally
bound to protect its people who have gone out upon these highways,
practically at the invitation of the state, and invested in lands and indus-
trial enterprises, the values of which are dependent upon the continued
operation of the rail highway. We do not say that the state is to be
held responsible for these losses; but it is its political duty to protect
its people, in so far as it can do so, by the maintenance of rights to use
highways which have been established by governmental authority.
The people who suffer losses by reason of the abandonment of a rail-
road have no right of action against the company or the state for finan-
cial indemnity for such losses. But nevertheless the state has a duty
to perform. The duties of the state are illustrated by many laws and
statutes dealing with different phases of the subject. For example, a
city street, generally speaking, may not be closed without the consent of
or compensation to the abutting owners.21 A country highway may
not be closed without such consent.2 2 Even a private easement over
lands for passage to and from a property may not be closed against the
a 27 A. & E. Enc. Law (2d ed. '9o4) 113, 114; 2 Elliott, Roads and Streets
(3d ed. i9gi) sec. rSo.
Ibid. secs. 882, 883.
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consent of the holder of the easement. There are public regulations
relating to maritime adventures, the employment of seamen, intended
to prevent the stranding of a ship or its passengers in foreign ports.
Equality of public service to all shippers and localities is required by
statutes. These and other instances that might be cited show the
care of the state in protecting its citizens against any action that will
unduly curtail their free movement or prejudice their privileges, or
render their properties less valuable or accessible.
Courts, says Elliott, "have also recognized an additional right in the
adjoining owner, distinct from his rights as a member of the general
public, namely, the right of access to his premises, or as it is called in
New York, the 'easement of access.' This is so far regarded as private
property that not even the legislature can take it away and deprive the
owner of it without compensation.
23
In reference to the forfeiture or expiration of charters for turnpikes
or toll roads the same author states the law as follows and cites
authorities in support thereof :24
"If the corporation owning the turnpike suffers it to get out of repair,
the corporate franchise may be forfeited to the state, and in that event
the road will become a public way of the governmental corporation or
body having control of roads of like character. This result will follow
if the road is abandoned by the private corporation. . . . A corpora-
tion accepting a charter authorizing the construction of a public high-
way ought to be held to take the franchise granted, upon the condition
thdt on the dissolution of the corporation the road shall remain open to
the public. The right to take tolls for a specified period should be
deemed to be all the benefit that the corporation was authorized to
receive, and, having received this, there should be no right to close the
road against the public travel. 25  . . . . In one of the oldest cases
upon this subject it was declared that highways could be discontinued
only by authority of law and never by the act of individuals. ' 26 In a
footnote the author says :27
"The fact that a private corporation desires to abandon the road and
does abandon it, leaves it a passage way for travel as long as the public
chooses to treat it as such. The: act of the private corporation does not
take away the rights of the public. [Citing authorities which support
the text] . . . ." The author also states :28 "A toll bridge erected under
a legislative grant for the use of the public for ordinary travel is in so
far a highway that upon its abandonment by the owners the public may
claim the right to maintain and use it if the local authorities so elect.
A highway once legally established cannot lose its character, if the pub-
lic duly object, except by its extinguishment or vacation in due course
of law. [Many state cases are cited.]"
'Ibid. sec. 882 and cases there cited.
24 1 Ibid. sec. 8o.
'Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. v. Commonwealth (1883) lO4 Pa. 583.
'Dawes v. Hawkins (i86o) 8 C. B. (N. s.) 848.
i Elliott, Roads & Streets (3d ed. 1911) sec. 8o, note 12.
'Ibid. sec. 49.
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The private parties affected by the abandonment of a rail highway
may be so extended from the line and so indefinite as to boundary as to
make it impossible to determine the territorial limits within which a
consent of parties so affected should be obtained.
It must, therefore, be left to the state to determine and fix the condi-
tions of abandonment so that the public and private interests affected
shall, to the extent permitted by constitutional law, be protected.
IV
Coming now to our second question: Upon what terms and conditions
should the state consent to an abandonment of an existing railroad?
We refer only to the highway. The equipment, which is personal
property used in operating the highway, belongs to the company and,
when the company ceases operation, may be removed and disposed of
for the benefit of its stockholders. The operation of the railroad is
important, but here we are met with the rule that private parties 'cannot
be compelled to operate at a loss.' The equipment belongs to operation
and is not an integral part of the highway.
The contention by the railroad companies up to the present time has
been that they could take away everything-rails, ties, bridges, build-
ings, etc., and sell the same at scrap value, thus realizing as much as
possible to reduce their losses. If no other interests were involved this
would undoubtedly be true. But, as already noted, there are other
interests quite as important and entitled to protection as that of the rail-
road investor. All the risks assumed by the railroad company were in
consideration of the right to enjoy the profits that should arise out of the
investment. It obtained its right of way, paying the full price of
the land, knowing that if it abandoned the operation of the railroad the
right of way would revert to the owners of the fee and be a total loss to
the investor.2 9 The state grants these rights or allows them to be
acquired by right of eminent domain to create a permanent public high-
way of this type to develop its territory and increase its national wealth.
The investors in private business along the line of the railroad did not
assume any risks as to the railroad. They do not share in the profit if
the railroad is a successful investment. They were invited to go out
along this highway and invest their money in private enterprises and
develop the resources of the country. To scrap the highway will leave
these people without access to the markets. The state is just as much
bound to protect the private interests that have been built up along the
line of a railroad, in so far as it can equitably do so, as it is to protect
the property rights of investors in the railroad. And in determining
the superior rights the maxim salus populi suprema lex should prevail.
In the case of canals and toll roads we find that when the franchise
" New Mexico v. United States Trust Co. (1898) 172 U. S. 171, 19 Sup. Ct. 128;
Northern Pacifi Ry. v. Towunsend (1903) 190 U. S. 267, 27i, 24 Sup. Ct. 671, 672;
Rio Graide Ry. v. Strintghamn (1915) 239 U. S. 44, 47, 36 Sup. Ct 5, 6.
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expired, or when the operating company desired to abandon further
operation, it could remove its personal property but could not destroy
the canal or toll road. They were highways of peculiar type and were
.constructed by private capital, in many instances, under the public
policy referred to, in order to develop -the territory and strengthen the
power of the government by inducing people to go out along the line
of a better highway and locate for business purposes. The canal, there-
fore, was to remain; the toll road was to remain, both complete as a
highway, to be thereafter operated, if operated at all, under further
provisions to be made by the government. The government might
operate them or-it might provide that the people along the lines whose
property interests were affected might organize and operate them with-
out paying for the highway. The investors in the railroad should have
no lien, for scrap value or otherwise, on the public highway. It may
be, and in many cases it is the fact, that the government and private
parties along the line could not afford to pay even the scrap value for
the highway and then furnish the money and capital necessary to
buy equipment and operate it to the small extent necessary to save
the situation. But if the highway belongs to the public and the
public has the right to say that it shall remain a highway of the type
constructed, then it may be quite feasible in many cases to protect the
public and the private interests by providing sufficient funds to secure
equipment and capital to operate the line.
It undoubtedly is true in some cases, where railroads have been built
for special purposes, that the entire abandonment of the highway may
be permissible. Where a railroad was built to take the single traffic of
a mine and the mine is exhausted and no other traffic has been created
to justify the maintenance of the highway; where a road was built to
carry out forest products, lumber, etc., and the forest may be exhausted
and the lands are not usable for purposes that will create traffic; in such
exceptional cases the state may find no necessity for maintaining the
highway and would allow the investor in the highway to scrap it. No
private or public interest would be affected in such cases. But such is
not the case where the highway serves existing public and private inter-
ests. In these cases the public and private interests should be pro-
tected even to the extent of increasing the loss to the investor in the
railroad. In such cases the questiofi of who assumed the risk is vital.
The builders of a railroad secure valuable franchises and opportunities
for profitable investment. In consideration of these grants they assume
the risk of creating a highway the entire abandonment of which will
work financial injury to public and private interests. In such cases the
loss-for there must be a loss-should fall upon the group that assumed
the risk for the prospective profits in operation and created the
conditions under which loss must be incurred.
Congress provided :30
"Act of Feb. 28, 1920 (41 Stat. at L. 456, 477).
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"After ninety days after this paragraph takes effect no carrier by rail-
road subject to this Act shall . . abandon all or any portion of a line
of railroad, or the operation thereof, unless and until there shall first
have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or
future public convenience and necessity permit of such abandonment.
"The application for and issuance of such certificate shall be under
such rules and regulations as to hearings and other matters as the Com-
mission may from time to time prescribe, and the provisions of this
Act shall apply to all such proceedings."
The Supreme Court' of the United States, passing upon the right, of
a railroad company owning and operating thirty miles of railroad
wholly within a state of the Union to abandon its line, speaking through
Mr. Justice Van Devanter, said :"'
"These considerations persuade us that the paragraphs in question
should be interpreted and read as not clothing the Commission with any
authority over the discontinuance of the purely intrastate business of a
road whose situation and ownership, as here, are such that interstate
and foreign commerce will not be burdened or affected by a continuance
of that business."
This recognizes the power of the state to determine whether there
may be an abandonment of the operation of a railroad-the Federal
Government to determine it as regards interstate commerce, and the
state of the Union in which the road operates to determine the question
as to intrastate commerce. In this case the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission required the company to hold the road for a certain time and
give the parties in interest an opportunity to raise money and purchase
the highway at a price presumed to be its scrap value. This procedure
if adopted generally throws the entire burden of loss upon the state
or upon innocent parties who are not usually able to finance the enter-
prise and thus protect themselves against great property loss. The
organization of farmers and men of small business along the line
to purchase and finance a railroad that has proved a failure is
impracticable in most cases.
In consideration of the conditions stated and the general law
upon this subject, it seems more consonant with equity and justice
that the loss of the highway should fall upon those who were to profit
by it if it proved a profitable investment. The state and those who are
made to suffer by the abandonment should not be compelled to pay for
the highway, even at its scrap value. Where there is a demand for
the maintenance and operation of the highway to protect the state and
private owners from irreparable loss, we submit that the state should
require that it remain a complete highway, of the type dedicated to
public use, its operation only to be provided for by the state or by the
persons whose property interests would be seriously affected by its
abandonment.
Texas v. Eastern Texas Ry. (i9g2) 42 Sup. Ct. 281, 284.
